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D

uring the Clinton administration, the
importance of our critical infrastructure was
highlighted by the National Security Council
in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63).
PDD 63 was superseded recently when President
Bush signed Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD 7, like its predecessor
PDD 63, establishes a national policy under which
federal departments and agencies are required to
identify and prioritize United States critical
infrastructure and the key resources needed to
protect them from terrorist attacks. PDD 63 and
HSPD 7 also encourage Federal departments and
agencies to form public and private partnerships to
pursue the goal of lowering risks to our national assets
due to malevolent events. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is assigned responsibility
for the water infrastructure, which includes both
drinking water and wastewater systems.
Subscribers (mainly water utilities) of the
American Water Works Association Research
Foundation (AwwaRF) were also becoming
concerned about security at drinking water utilities
and encouraged AwwaRF to assist them in
understanding potential malevolent threats. In
response to PDD 63, and with input from public water
utilities, both EPA and AwwaRF initiated programs
to understand and mitigate the security vulnerabilities
of drinking water utilities. The events of 9/11
accelerated the development of these programs.
This paper describes efforts to assess and mitigate
the vulnerabilities of drinking water utilities. (See
O’Neill and Hais, this volume, for a discussion of
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wastewater security issues.) This paper covers
several key areas, including threat assessment, water
contamination, and response effectiveness.

Law Requires Vulnerability
Assessments
On June 12, 2002, President Bush signed the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 into law
(PL 107-188). This Act requires community water
systems that serve populations of greater than 3,300
persons to conduct vulnerability assessments.
According to EPA statistics, approximately 4,800
water utilities fit into this category. When combined,
these water utilities serve over 256 million people.
Large drinking water utilities, defined as those
serving more than 100,000 people, were required to
conduct their vulnerability assessments and submit
a report to the EPA by March 31, 2003. Drinking
water utilities serving 50,000 to 100,000 people were
to conduct their vulnerability assessments and submit
a report by December 31, 2003. Drinking water
utilities serving 3,300 to 50,000 people were to
conduct their vulnerability assessments and submit
a report by June 30, 2004.

Vulnerability Assessment Process
In cooperation with the EPA and AwwaRF,
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) created the
Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities
known as RAM-WTM. RAM-WTM is the most widely
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used methodology to assess security risks at large
water utilities. Several thousand water utility owners/
operators, regulators, and water industry consultants
have been trained in the use of RAM-WTM. Other
tools have been developed by other entities and were
used at several large water utilities, but were applied
more prevalently to medium and small water utilities.
Figure 1 illustrates the process followed in RAMTM
W and demonstrates the iterative nature of the
methodology. This methodology was developed
through decades of security research and
development at Sandia, initially focused on safety of
nuclear facilities. Ideally, the entire analysis is driven
by the threats one wants to protect against. In many
high-security applications, this threat level is
determined by a federal entity (e.g., the Department
of Energy or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
and a designated security analyst then evaluates the
effectiveness of the security system. Most highsecurity applications also employ an on-site guard
force, usually armed and well trained, to respond to
malevolent incidents. Managers of the majority of
civilian infrastructures do not employ a dedicated
response force and operate geographically distributed
assets, the majority of which reside in the public
realm.
Each major block of the methodology has multiple
steps and/or requirements. For a complete

description of RAM-W TM , please contact the
American Water Works Association for a copy (the
requestor must demonstrate a need-to-know and
must sign a nondisclosure agreement). AwwaRF
subscribers may contact them directly.

Results
Sandia conducted several vulnerability
assessments during the development and validation
of RAM-W TM and water utility owners/operators
and consultants applied the methodology at several
hundred additional locations. As a result, the water
community gained a good understanding of the state
of security at water utilities and identified challenges
that may lie ahead. In a recent project, AwwaRF
and Sandia teamed to collect information on the
vulnerability assessments conducted by the large
water utilities to better understand (1) how well the
process worked, (2) remaining areas of concern,
and (3) what further developmental efforts to pursue
(AwwaRF 2004).

Defining the Threat to Water Utilities
Although encouraged to contact local law
enforcement and other authorities, most water
utilities found it difficult to obtain relevant threat data.

Figure 1. RAM-WTM Process
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As stated earlier, the specified threat drives the risk
analysis. Therefore, water utilities are faced with a
high degree of ambiguity about what the actual
threats are while having to undertake risk reduction
programs that may cost millions of dollars. Even
with the billions of dollars already being spent to
improve the security of our nation’s water utilities, it
is questionable whether or not the utilities will be
able to withstand a high-level threat. Much of the
utilities’ infrastructure resides in the public realm, is
broadly distributed, and is very difficult to protect.
The Federal government has not defined a threat
that can be used as the basis of a security design for
the water infrastructure, nor is there agreement in
the water community about what threats to consider.
Therefore, the water utilities analyzed a multitude
of threats and threat levels. Neighboring water
utilities often used significantly different threat levels
during their risk assessment. The number of
adversaries and their projected capabilities will
dramatically affect the outcome of the security risk
analysis.

Contamination of Water Supplies
One of the least understood threats to the drinking
water industry is contamination, particularly in the
water distribution system. At the beginning of the
program to assess the vulnerabilities of water
utilities, very little was known about malevolent water
contamination and even fewer analytical tools were
available to help understand and analyze the problem.
Since 9/11, several groups, including the AwwaRF,
the EPA, and the Center for Disease Control, have
collaborated to collect and characterize information
on contaminants that may pose a significant health
threat in drinking water systems. Prioritizing
contaminants, developing methods to rapidly detect
them, developing a full understanding of contaminant
fate and transport, developing estimates for
contamination risks to water distribution systems,
creating programs for isolating and treating
contaminants, and final restoration of clean water
supplies are all in their early stages of development.
Sandia has launched an internal research program,
with collaborators at EPA, to provide tools for
answering many of these important contaminationrelated questions. This research program will
develop numerical tools to probabilistically predict
the fate and transport of a variety of potential
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contaminants and thus facilitate the development of
contamination risk maps for water distribution
systems. The research program will also help
determine optimal sensor locations for detection of
contaminants (assuming the appropriate sensors are
developed) and develop analytical tools to quickly
locate where contaminants were introduced.

Response to Threats
High-security environments often have an on-site
response force to deal with malevolent threats. The
vast majority of water utilities do not employ such a
strategy. Instead, they rely on cooperation from local
law enforcement, public health authorities, and other
providers of emergency services. This is not an
unusual situation within the community of critical
infrastructures, but this approach leads to long
response times, raising a concern about the level of
security provided.
Immediately after 9/11, many metropolitan areas
assigned police officers at water utility assets to deter
adversaries. Due to budget constraints and a belief
that the threat is not as imminent as previously
believed, this practice has been largely discontinued.

Recommendations
Based on the experience of applying RAM-WTM
to hundreds of water utilities, several improvements
could enhance future risk assessments. These
improvements include: a refined threat description,
complete integration of the water distribution system
contamination analysis with the risk assessment,
and improved response protocols. Naturally, these
recommendations will require resources and time
to accomplish.
Because the threat level drives the risk
assessment analysis and ultimately, the risk
reduction recommendations, the area of threat
assessment could be improved. A variety of
approaches may be taken, such as the following:
1. Issue a mandatory threat level for all water
utilities (minimum standard) to use as the basis
for determining which risk reduction upgrades
are appropriate
2. Use a graded approach to implementing
upgrades based on population served or some
other statistic, such as volume of water shipped
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3.

Water-community-developed threat scenarios
that are graded by population
4. Threat levels based on regional or target
attractiveness
Whatever threat definition system is chosen,
consistency and minimally acceptable threat levels
should be created to provide a balanced approach
to countering the threat.
The water distribution system has long been
known to represent one of the greatest security
vulnerabilities. Current challenges include a lack
of clear understanding of the fate and transport
and consequences of potential contaminants within
a water distribution system coupled with generally
easy access into the system. To minimize the
potential risks from a malevolent contamination
attack, it is first necessary to develop computational
tools that can predict the fate and transport of
contaminants within distribution systems, or more
generally, how contaminants might move in a
hydraulically complex pipe network. This
computational tool must be integrated within a
systematic framework (as embodied in
RAM-WTM), so that a more comprehensive risk
assessment can be accomplished. Such a tool (or
set of tools) (1) would be capable of determining
(in a probabilistic sense) the spread of contaminants
within a distribution system, (2) could be used to
estimate consequences from such an attack, (3)
would be able to identify optimum locations for
early-warning sensors, and (4) would be able to
identify the source location (point of introduction)
in near-real time. Determining the extent of
contamination in a water distribution system in real
time is essential so that proper actions can be taken
to minimize the further spread of the contaminants.
Methodologies for conducting vulnerability
assessments should include a framework for
cleanup and recovery. The tools to estimate the
fate and transport of contaminants within a water
distribution system could also play a significant role
in developing a methodology for recovery after
such an event and could serve as the instrument to
integrate both components for the protection of
drinking water systems.
Better response protocols are needed in several
areas. Response to water contamination events is
entirely different than response to an armed attack
where the intent is to damage the utility’s physical
assets. The current research underway to
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understand the fate and transport of contaminants
will help decision makers understand the risk and
to develop new response protocols that address
that attack before the contamination event. Those
protocols must include clean-up processes and
placing the system back in service.
Responding to threats may require new
approaches that greatly enhance the time an
adversary needs to complete a malevolent act.
Threats can be countered by storing highconsequence assets underground, limiting the paths
an adversary might exploit and thereby creating
long task times. For example, pumping stations
could be protected better by installing them below
grade in protected shelters.
In testimony to the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Science entitled
“H.R. 3178 and the Development of Anti-Terrorism
Tools for Water Infrastructure,” Jeffrey J.
Danneels of Sandia suggested several alternatives
that might provide the improved security desired
at a much lower cost than the physical security
approaches currently in use. Research dollars
should be made available to study alternatives that
put final treatment of the water supply closer to
the consumer, consider much of the present potable
water system as non-potable to decentralize the
impact of a potential event, and evaluate the
efficacy of creating municipal bottling facilities and
other novel approaches that provide the level of
security demanded by the water consumer and
which may not be achievable through any other
means.

Conclusions
Understanding and analyzing the vulnerabilities
within the water infrastructure is a very important
undertaking. Our government needs to protect one
of the most basic assets America has—a clean
water supply. Understanding and analyzing the
vulnerabilities within the nation’s water infrastructure
will help us protect the health and safety of our
citizens. The efforts completed to date have
highlighted several vulnerabilities that will require
significant amounts of effort to correct. Within the
list of 14 U.S. critical infrastructures listed in HSPD7, the water infrastructure is probably the most taken
for granted. A large investment will be required to
provide even minimal levels of security for this
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important resource. “When is enough, enough?”
will be a difficult question to answer and will be
debated for years to come.
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